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ABSTRACT 
 The separation of powers doctrine creates a strong presumption in 
favor of judicial deference to legislative policy determinations. This 
doctrine was developed for federal courts, however, and does not 
apply with identical force to state courts enforcing state constitutional 
rights. This Note examines rationales for the separation of powers 
doctrine and their potential application to state courts. After 
concluding that deference should be more limited in state courts, it 
then applies this conclusion to educational rights, which are 
frequently at risk due to political market failures. By examining case 
studies of constitutionally based education litigation in seven states, 
this Note concludes with recommendations to state courts facing the 
challenge of managing such cases: issue a strong first opinion, 
maintain jurisdiction by remanding the case rather than finalizing it, 
and demonstrate an upfront commitment to enforcing educational 
rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1973 in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez,1 the Supreme Court of the United States held that there is 
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 1. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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no federal constitutional right to education.2 In the wake of 
Rodriguez, school districts and civil rights groups around the country 
began to file suits in state courts under state constitutional 
provisions.3 These suits challenged state funding structures that 
disadvantaged racial and economic minorities, and they fell along two 
lines of argument: disparate funding between districts violated the 
state’s equal protection guarantees (equity claims), or the funding 
system prohibited students in low-wealth districts from receiving an 
adequate education as required by the education clause of the state 
constitution (adequacy claims).4 Between 1973 and 2007, there were 
eleven successful equity claims and twenty successful adequacy claims 
covering twenty-six states.5  
Even several decades after Rodriguez, however, family education 
and income levels remained the best predictors of a child’s future 
academic success.6 Nationwide, minority students were only two-
 
 2. Id. at 35. 
 3. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas 
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 220 
n.4 (1990). These suits followed the sage advice of Justice William Brennan that “[s]tate 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond 
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” William J. Brennan, Jr., 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
For a catalog of such provisions, see Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under 
State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992). 
 4. See Thro, supra note 3, at 222, 225, 233 (explaining that Rodriguez and other claims 
based on the federal constitution made up the first wave of litigation, the second wave was 
equity suits based on state constitutions, and the third wave consists of adequacy suits based on 
state constitutions). But see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: 
A Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (noting that “courts have fused their equity and 
adequacy analyses” and that it is often difficult to distinguish second and third wave cases 
effectively). 
 5. Sonja Ralston Elder, School Financing Lawsuits: The Way out of the Fog or Just 
Blowing Smoke?, 3 EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., 5 tbl.1 (2007), http://www.educationlawconsortium. 
org/forum/2007/papers/Ralston2007.pdf. States with successful equity rulings (“equity states”) 
include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. States with successful adequacy rulings 
(“adequacy states”) include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id. 
 6. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, 
ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
(2004) (documenting the variety of pervasive differences between the classes that explains much 
of the discrepancy between lower-class and middle-class average student scores). 
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thirds as likely to graduate from high school as white students.7 
Students who do not learn to read well are significantly more likely to 
be unemployed, incarcerated, and poor.8 A quality education is 
critical for all children, yet not all children have the opportunity to 
receive that education. 
As the persistence of dramatic inequities demonstrates, not all 
courtroom victories have become classroom successes; indeed, in 
some states, very little has changed. For example, in Ohio, ten years 
after the first Ohio Supreme Court decision,9 the state’s system of 
education financing remained unconstitutional,10 and the Ohio 
Supreme Court decided that its involvement in the matter was 
finished.11 In many cases, state courts are reluctant to “usurp” 
policymaking power from the legislature, and in their respect for the 
idea of separation of powers,12 they leave class after class of 
schoolchildren without the announced, basic constitutional right to an 
adequate education.13 
This Note advocates that state courts intervene more actively to 
remedy violations of individuals’ state constitutional rights when 
legislatures have been recalcitrant. In these circumstances, the courts 
are justified in taking action because arguments advocating judicial 
restraint for Article III courts do not apply wholesale to state courts. 
Although this Note focuses on the education clauses of state 
 
 7. See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW MINORITY YOUTH ARE 
BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 2 (2004), available at http://www. 
urban.org/UploadedPDF/410936_LosingOurFuture.pdf (observing that in 2001 only 50 percent 
of black students, 51 percent of Native American students, and 53 percent of Hispanic students 
graduated from high school, whereas 75 percent of white students graduated). 
 8. Nat’l Inst. for Literacy, Facts & Statistics, http://www.nifl.gov/nifl/facts/workforce.html 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 9. The Ohio Supreme Court first addressed the state’s education system in DeRolph v. 
State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
 10. The Ohio Supreme Court has never recanted its original determination that the state’s 
financing system is unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 127–41.  
 11. See State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) (“The 
duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy an educational system that has been 
found . . . to still be unconstitutional.”); see also Christen Spears Hignett, Comment, Ohio’s 
Public School Funding System: The Unanswered Questions and the Unresolved Problems of 
DeRolph, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 739, 739–40 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Ohio . . . ruled 
that . . . the courts of Ohio could no longer exercise any jurisdiction in this case.”). 
 12. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006) 
(“[W]e must avoid intrusion on the primary domain of another branch of government.”). 
 13. See Hignett, supra note 11, at 740 (explaining how “legislative inaction and judicial 
reluctance and restraint” in the Ohio cases have left the students virtually “without redress”). 
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constitutions, the analysis regarding the role of and limits on the state 
courts’ powers could apply to any state constitutional violation. Part I 
examines the separation of powers doctrine and argues that it should 
not be interpreted as stringently in state courts as it is in the federal 
courts. Part II explains how the separation of powers issue applies to 
educational rights in particular. Then, to better understand the ideal 
path for educational rights cases, Part III presents case studies of 
successes in Kentucky and Massachusetts, where the system 
functioned as designed and each branch upheld its end of the 
separation of powers bargain. Finally, Part IV examines three 
alternative court reactions to legislative inaction through the school 
financing experiences in Ohio and New Jersey, in New York and 
North Carolina, and in Nevada, with the latter three states providing 
models for how state courts can overcome reluctant legislatures and 
uphold students’ educational rights. 
I.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
The idea of separation of powers has always been an integral 
part of the federal government and national constitution.14 It plays a 
central role in the United States’ unique experiment with democracy 
as it serves to “implement a fundamental insight: concentration of 
power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”15 At the 
federal level, it is generally accepted that there are solid distinctions 
between the powers of each branch.16 Based on these structural 
features, the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal courts 
should generally defer to the legislative and executive branches 
regarding policymaking.17 Even at the federal level, however, judicial 
deference has its limits because the very purpose of the judiciary is to 
 
 14. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (“The principle of separation of powers 
was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the 
document that they drafted . . . .”). 
 15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice 
Kennedy goes on to quote the Federalist Papers’ statement that “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 16. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124 (emphasizing that separation of powers is not “an 
abstract generalization”). The text of the Constitution also suggests such distinctions. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative [p]owers” in Congress (emphasis added)). 
 17. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (finding that the determination of the 
“general welfare” for purposes of the Spending Clause requires discretion, which is vested in 
Congress and not the courts). 
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uphold the people’s constitutional rights and to provide a check on 
the power of the other branches.18 Separation of powers is therefore a 
good starting point for the courts, but by no means absolute. 
In Rodriguez,19 the Supreme Court explained that “the Justices of 
this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local 
problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to 
the raising and disposition of public revenues.”20 Concluding that the 
problems of funding and implementing education are complex, the 
Court decided that the legislature’s judgments were “entitled to 
respect.”21 Judicial deference based on the separation of powers 
doctrine continues to rule in federal courts, but deference should not 
be an end in itself, only a means of enforcing the structural balance of 
power established by the Constitution. If the underlying structural 
reasons for deferring are absent in a particular case, deference should 
not be mandated. In the federal system, separation of powers 
arguments for deference of Article III courts are rooted in three key 
structural aspects of the Constitution: (1) the federal constitution that 
federal courts uphold is primarily one of negative rights,22 (2) the 
federal government is one of limited powers,23 and (3) the federal 
courts are beyond popular review.24 A fourth and more practical 
 
 18. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 870 (1960) (“[T]he judiciary 
was made independent because it has . . . the primary responsibility and duty of giving force and 
effect to constitutional liberties and limitations upon the executive and legislative branches.”); 
see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”). 
 19. This Note does not address the propriety of Rodriguez. Until it is overruled, however, 
future efforts to ensure educational rights must work within its framework. 
 20. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973). 
 21. Id. at 42. 
 22. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) 
(upholding against constitutional challenge a state’s inaction because “nothing in the language 
of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its 
citizens against invasion by private actors”). Although DeShaney deals with action by a state 
government, it interprets the federal Constitution. Id. at 191. 
 23. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial 
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1143–45 (1996) (discussing the limits on 
the powers of the federal government imposed by the Tenth Amendment and Article III, 
Section 2, Clause 1). 
 24. Concern about unelected judges overriding the determinations of legislative majorities 
is perhaps the most frequently given reason for the need for judicial restraint. See, e.g., 
Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 635 (2005) (“The existence 
of judicial review . . . poses the countermajoritarian danger that unelected judges, who are 
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reason is also sometimes cited by the courts as a rationale for 
deference: they consider the federal courts largely incompetent in 
making policy.25 Each of these four issues does not apply in the same 
way to state courts.26 This Part explores these rationales and their 
application to state courts in turn. 
A. State Constitutions Provide Positive Rights 
First and most importantly, state courts enforce state 
constitutions that are substantively different from the federal 
constitution. As the Supreme Court envisions it, the federal 
constitution is one of negative rights27—rights that prevent the 
government from doing something to people, like unreasonably 
searching their homes28 and that cannot be violated by government 
inaction. In contrast, all state constitutions contain at least some 
positive rights29—rights that entitle people to some benefit or action 
 
intentionally insulated from political accountability will . . . trump the policy preferences of the 
representative branches of government.”). 
 25. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41 (reiterating that the Justices “lack . . . the expertise” to 
tackle certain problems). 
 26. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977) (noting 
that federal and state courts are not the same and that it is dangerous to assume that they are); 
see also Amanda S. Hawthorne, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, The Opportunity in 
Adequacy Litigation: Recognizing the Legitimacy and Value of Pursuing Educational Reform 
through the Courts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 761, 762 (2005) (“Educational reform through the courts is 
justified given the inherent flexibility of the separation of powers doctrine at the state 
level . . . .”). 
It is important to remember that there are fifty state constitutions, all different, that all 
provide for a different balance of power between the state’s branches of government. 
Therefore, each of these issues (particularly the first two) varies a great deal in how strongly it 
applies to a given state. In a broader sense, this section is an argument against federal bias in 
state courts: one should not assume that all state courts operate by the same rules or principles 
that the federal courts do. 
 27. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause 
itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a 
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (summarizing Supreme Court precedent from Harris v. McRae, 488 
U.S. 297 (1980), Judge Posner commented that “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties”); see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (explaining that Judge Posner’s characterization “finds support 
in the constitutional language, in Supreme Court decisions, and in the history of the Bill of 
Rights as a safeguard against governmental intrusion”). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (“Unlike the Federal Constitution, 
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from the state government;30 the right to education is a quintessential 
example of a positive right. By including these positive rights, state 
constitutions “explicitly engage state courts in substantive areas that 
have historically been outside the Article III domain.”31 
With positive rights, the courts have to be more involved because 
it is more difficult to “ensure that the government is doing its job”32 
than it is to prohibit certain behaviors.33 As Professor Helen 
Hershkoff puts it, “[t]he enforcement of positive rights thus requires a 
state court to share explicitly in public governance, engaging in the 
principled dialogue that commentators traditionally associate with the 
common law resolution of social and economic issues.”34 An 
appropriate application of the separation of powers doctrine to 
positive rights would “recognize that legislative action satisfying a 
constitutional obligation is extremely unlikely unless judicial rulings 
call for such action.”35 In the absence of the judicial requirement to 
provide the right and judicial threat to act in the stead of a 
recalcitrant legislature, legislative actors have little incentive to spend 
money raised in their own districts on constituents in other districts 
because there is no electoral return for the political risk.36 Judicial 
threats are a common means of enforcing constitutional rights; for 
example, Article III courts threaten through the exclusionary rule to 
suppress evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment.37 
 
every state constitution in the United States addresses social and economic concerns, and 
provides the basis for a variety of positive claims against the government.”). 
 30. Id. at 1138 (“[P]ositive rights not only restrain the government’s exercise of power, but 
also compel its exercise, constraining the government to use its assigned authority to carry out a 
specified constitutional purpose.”). 
 31. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1890 (2001). 
 32. See Hershkoff, supra note 29, at 1138. 
 33. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1890–91 (“[I]f negative rights under the federal 
Constitution restrain government action, positive rights under state constitutions mandate such 
action.” (citation omitted)). Additionally, more judicial involvement is warranted because these 
provisions of state constitutions are more complex than the prohibitions in the federal 
Constitution and need more interpretation and enforcement. Id. 
 34. Hershkoff, supra note 29, at 1138. 
 35. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: 
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1089 (1993). 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (explaining that the rule’s “purpose is 
to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available 
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”). 
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Because state courts are charged with enforcing a different type of 
constitutional right, different types of judicial threats are appropriate. 
B. State Governments Are Not As Limited As the Federal 
Government 
One reason frequently given for the need for restraint and 
deference from the federal courts is that the federal government as a 
whole is one of limited powers.38 Article III courts were established in 
direct rejection of the English common law system of courts in which 
final appeal rested with the House of Lords, which frequently mixed 
policymaking with judicial determinations.39 On the other hand, states 
are sovereigns with legislative and judicial powers broader than those 
of the federal government,40 and state courts have inherent powers as 
well as statutorily granted ones.41 
Article III courts are also subjected to substantial limits on their 
powers through the Constitution’s jurisdictional restraints.42 Many 
state courts are not similarly restricted.43 Moreover, nearly all state 
courts are common law courts, directly engaged in crafting the law as 
well as applying it.44 Common law jurisprudence is inherently a 
policymaking enterprise because the process of selecting a legal test 
 
 38. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1888; see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 
(2000) (“Congress’ . . . authority is not without effective bounds.”). 
 39. Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
75, 103–04 (1995) (noting that in 1787 “no court in England or any American state” had final 
appellate authority and that many state legislatures “retained the authority to review judicial 
decisions”). After the ratification of the federal constitution, many states moved away from the 
English model and established separate judiciaries, but they did so in a variety of manners and 
at different times. See id. at 104–05 (“At the time of the convention, many state appellate courts, 
such as those of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, provided entirely new trials 
for appellants. In other states, such as the Carolinas, trial-court judges met together to consider 
appeals.”). 
 40. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers “not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution” to the states). 
 41. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1888–89 (“[T]he concept of inherent authority provides a 
legitimating wedge for state judicial activity even when the constitution or statutory scheme 
does not explicitly grant jurisdiction.”). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 43. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1845–46. 
 44. Id. at 1889 (explaining that the common law system inherently involves “state courts in 
social and economic policymaking”). Although the historical traditions of Louisiana law are 
rooted in the Napoleonic Code rather than English common law, Louisiana’s public law and 
court systems are and have always been based on the common law model. Mary Garvey Algero, 
The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil 
Law State in a Common Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 777 (2005). 
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for tort liability or good faith dealing, for example, rests in large part 
on what values the court decides to uphold and then on how such 
values can be promoted through rules, tests, and doctrines.45 It is 
therefore not out of place for state courts to engage in the 
policymaking decisions necessary to enforce and uphold 
constitutional rights. 
C. State Judges Are Not beyond Popular Review 
Another oft-cited reason for judicial restraint at the federal level 
is that the federal judiciary is beyond popular control: judges are 
appointed by the executive for life terms.46 In such a system, there is 
legitimate concern for those worried about a loss of democratic 
control if judges insert themselves too much into policymaking, 
which, by design, is to be carried out by the popularly elected 
branches of government. Thirty-eight states, however, engage in some 
form of judicial elections.47 Eleven of the remaining twelve states 
usually appoint judges for terms that are renewable by the state 
legislature; only Rhode Island appoints judges for life.48 Although the 
merits of judicial elections are debatable, the fact that nearly all state 
court judges are elected or subject to review by elected officials 
means that criticisms of so-called judicial activism based on life tenure 
are largely inapplicable to state courts.  
 
 45. See Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1889 (“The common law’s continuing vitality, involving 
state courts in social and economic policymaking, effectively ‘blur[s] the lines of separation of 
powers within and among state institutions.’” (quoting Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, 
Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999)) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 16 
(1983) (“What can fairly be inferred from the constitutional scheme [of life appointment in 
Article III] is that the judges are not to exercise the same free-wheeling legislative discretion as 
the elected representatives . . . .”). 
 47. JAN WITOLD BARAN, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION/ELECTION 1 (2006). There 
are two main types of judicial elections. In the first type of system, judges run for their bench 
seats in the same way legislators run for their statehouse ones. In the second, judges are 
appointed by the executive or by the legislature and periodically run unopposed in retention 
elections. Any judge who is not reelected is replaced by a new appointment. Id. 
 48. Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (surveying information about each state’s judiciary). Interestingly, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has ruled that education adequacy is a nonjusticiable political 
question. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) (“Because we believe the 
proper forum for this deliberation is the General Assembly, not the courtroom, we decline to 
endorse the trial justice’s plan . . . .”). 
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D. State Courts Are Competent Policymakers 
Finally, there is concern about the policymaking competence of 
Article III courts. These concerns come in two varieties: federalist 
and interbranch. The federalist concern, as the Supreme Court put it 
in Rodriguez, says that a key reason the federal courts should stay out 
of local policy issues like education is their incompetence regarding 
the policymaking that school funding inevitably requires.49 There is 
little question that crafting a constitutional school funding system, 
like the remedial phase of much public law litigation, is “essentially 
part of a process of policy design and implementation.”50 Yet that 
does not necessarily mean that courts should stay out; courts 
routinely deal with complex and controversial issues. In their 
continued struggle to desegregate American schools, even the federal 
courts made use of some unusual tools, such as special masters, that 
substantially improved the courts’ competence in designing 
remedies.51 Additionally, state courts have smaller jurisdictions and 
closer ties to the community, so their competence in crafting 
appropriate remedies in positive rights cases is arguably much greater 
than that of their federal counterparts.52 
The interbranch concern pertains to the comparative 
competence of the branches; most state constitutions “do not reflect 
the same level of trust in state legislative decisionmaking as does the 
federal Constitution in congressional decisionmaking.”53 This lack of 
trust is eminently reasonable. Some states have only part-time 
legislatures54 or ones that only meet biennially.55 Even in those states 
where serving as a representative is a full-time job, legislatures are 
 
 49. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973). 
 50. Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance, 
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
281, 310 (1998). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. (“Complex issues are nothing new to the judiciary.”). 
 53. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1892–93. 
 54. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Backgrounder: Full- and Part-Time 
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2004/backgrounder_fullandpart.htm (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that there are seventeen legislatures that can be considered 
part-time in which legislators are only paid an average of about $16,000 and average just over 
one staff person per legislator). 
 55. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Session History, http://www.ncsl.org/Programs/ 
legismgt/about/sesshistory.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
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often understaffed56 and rarely have the time to fully research 
national trends or best practices. Many states have constitutional 
provisions limiting the actions of the legislature such as bans on 
special legislation, which were enacted to combat legislative abuses 
and corruption.57 In sum, unlike the situation between Congress and 
the Article III courts, many state legislatures do not possess an 
institutional competency greater than that of their state courts; 
therefore, interbranch concerns about competence do not apply to 
the state courts in the same blanket way they are applied to the 
federal courts, and federalist concerns are, by definition, inapplicable 
to state courts dealing with state issues. 
*          *          * 
For the Article III courts, the Constitution may require a stricter 
separation of powers, but this doctrine should not be applied 
wholesale to state courts without considering the reasoning behind it. 
State courts, unlike Article III courts, enforce positive rights, are not 
courts of limited powers, are generally democratically accountable, 
and are more competent than federal courts relative to their 
legislative counterparts in overseeing policy implementation. 
This broader view of the separation of powers doctrine at the 
state level means that state courts should see themselves as 
empowered and obligated to be as involved as is necessary to ensure 
that all students are receiving a constitutionally adequate education. 
II.  “DEFERENCE, HOWEVER, HAS ITS LIMITS.”58 
At the state court level, there is widespread agreement that 
judicial deference reaches its limits when the other branches of 
government enact policies that violate people’s constitutional rights 
or, conversely, fail to enact policies needed to protect those rights. 
Section A demonstrates such agreement in school financing and 
educational adequacy cases, and Section B examines why it is justified 
under public choice theory. 
 
 56. See generally Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Staff Trends in the 50 State 
Legislatures: 1979, 1988, 1996, 2003, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/staffchg.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (showing a decline in the total number of staff in state legislatures 
between 1996 and 2003, which suggests possible understaffing). 
 57. Hershkoff, supra note 31, at 1894. 
 58. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006). 
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A. The Infringement of Constitutional Rights is the Limit of 
Deference 
It is precisely because each branch of government is charged with 
different duties that the courts’ deference to the legislative and 
executive branches must have limits: without such limits, the courts 
could not fulfill their function as the ultimate protector of the 
people’s rights.59 Education adequacy cases are some of the most 
political, policy-heavy issues dealt with by state courts. Yet 
throughout the canons of education adequacy law, courts have found 
that judicial deference is limited, even when they have refused to act 
on such findings.60 For example, the abundantly cautious New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated in 1997, after more than twenty years of 
deferential judicial involvement in the state’s education financing 
policy,61 that a judicial remedy was finally needed to “vindicate the 
constitutional rights of the school children in the poverty-stricken 
urban districts.”62 As the New Jersey court suggested, the limits of 
judicial deference are reached when the other branches of 
government fail (sometimes repeatedly) to remedy unconstitutional 
situations that violate people’s rights.63 In education adequacy cases, 
 
 59. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975) (calling the 
courts “the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution’s command”). 
 60. See, e.g., Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 1003 (Galway, J., concurring 
specially in part and dissenting in part) (“While it is appropriate to give due deference to a co-
equal branch of government as long as it is functioning within constitutional constraints, it 
would be a serious dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional 
violation.” (quoting Baines v. N.H. Senate President, 876 A.2d 768, 775 (N.H. 2005))). The New 
Hampshire court ultimately refused to supply meaning to the state’s right to education because 
it continued to see that task as one for the legislature. Id. at 996 (majority opinion). 
 61. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997) (noting that “one must 
evaluate an alternative, ‘wait and see’ approach,” but, given “the persistence and depth of the 
constitutional deprivation, and in the absence of any real prospect for genuine educational 
improvement in the most needy districts, that approach is no longer an option”). 
 62. Id.; see also Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 996 (“[T]he judiciary has a 
responsibility to ensure that constitutional rights not be hollowed out and, in the absence of 
action by other branches, a judicial remedy is not only appropriate but essential.”); Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 62 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“Having failed to satisfy their responsibility, defendants now 
compel this Court to determine the specific steps that must be taken to remedy the undisputed 
constitutional violation.”); James C. Sheil, Note, The Just-Do-It Decision: School-Funding 
Litigation Tests the Limits of Judicial Deference, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 620, 647 (1997) 
(“When a governmental body fails to meet its constitutional obligations, the courts are not only 
empowered, but are obligated to act.”). 
 63. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 724 (noting that “there comes a time when no alternative [to 
judicial action] remains”); see also Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to 
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courts should begin their enforcement of students’ rights with 
deference to and trust in the coequal branches of government, but 
they should always be on the lookout for evidence that “[their] trust 
was misplaced” and a more active remedy has become necessary.64 
In fact, many courts recognize that the limits to their deference 
are not discretionary. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a 
court “must use power equal to its responsibility” as the last-resort 
protector of the people’s rights.65 The New Hampshire Supreme 
Court has required that when the other branches fail to act, “a 
judicial remedy is not only appropriate but essential.”66 The chief 
judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye, proclaimed 
that when the state failed to bring the school funding statute into 
constitutional compliance, the court was “compel[led]” to act in its 
stead.67 The Wyoming Supreme Court found that the scope of its 
“duty to protect individual rights include[d] compelling legislative 
action.”68 The Arkansas Supreme Court also found that it had a 
“duty . . . to assure constitutional compliance” when it gave the 
legislature less than a year to fix its failing education system or have 
the solution mandated by the court.69 The list goes on. Although these 
limits apply to all state constitutional cases, they are reached 
frequently in cases regarding educational rights because such rights 
are positive in nature and can be infringed by legislative inaction. 
Indeed, when enforcing negative rights, deference to the 
legislature is more easily justified because the court’s action in 
striking down the offending law ends the constitutional violation; no 
further legislative action is needed to remedy the situation. With 
positive rights, on the other hand, the legislature’s inaction is the very 
source of the constitutional violation and deference allows that 
 
an Adequate Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 142 (“A court should be constrained by the 
limitations of its role. It should not, however, abandon its duty to determine whether the 
legislature has complied with the State’s constitution.”); Sheil, supra note 62, at 631–32 
(explaining that the court’s remedy in Abbott IV was based on its reasoning “that the court’s 
role as the ultimate protector of constitutional rights demanded action” despite its respect for 
the separation of powers doctrine). 
 64. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 62 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 65. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 724. 
 66. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU #12, 907 A.2d at 996. 
 67. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 62 (Kaye, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 68. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995). 
 69. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 220 S.W.3d 645, 657 (Ark. 2005). 
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violation to persist.70 Thus judicial deference should be most limited 
in cases that concern positive rights. 
B. Educational Rights in Peril 
The sheer volume of educational rights lawsuits attests to the fact 
that the positive right to education is often underprovided. A market-
based model like public choice theory is apropos to the problems 
surrounding the provision of educational rights, because it provides 
an explanation for why legislatures have so frequently failed to 
adequately fund the education of impoverished children. Public 
choice theory explains that one can conceive of democratic 
institutions, such as legislatures, as a type of political market.71 In the 
political market, politicians act to maximize their chances for 
reelection, and one gains election by accumulating more votes 
(political capital) than one’s opponent.72 To maximize efficiency, the 
politician will seek capital with a low marginal cost, from interest 
groups who control large numbers of votes and are easy to please.73 
When they function properly and there are no externalities such as 
disenfranchisement, political markets, like economic markets, provide 
an efficient allocation of resources.74 Like economic markets, 
however, political markets can fail.75 Such failures are most likely to 
occur, almost by definition, when the rights of the powerless are at 
stake because the majority is making the laws. When there is a 
political market failure in the legislative branch, the courts can 
 
 70. In the segregation context, several lower courts treated states’ violations of the separate 
but equal requirement as violation of a positive right—the right to equal facilities provided by 
the state—and accordingly refused to defer to the legislature for a remedy. In ordering 
Delaware’s schools integrated, Chancellor Seitz rejected deference to the legislature as 
equivalent to telling the plaintiff, “Yes, your Constitutional rights are being invaded, but be 
patient, we will see whether in time they are still being violated.” Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 
862, 870 (Del. Ch. 1952), aff’d, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952). 
 71. Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice 
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. (“The politician will accept campaign contributions from interest groups until 
the marginal cost in votes of taking another contribution is equal to the contribution’s marginal 
benefit.”). 
 74. See id. at 14–16 (explaining that inegalitarian distribution of political capital, common 
in the modern system of campaign finance, creates a Kaldor-Hicks inefficient allocation of 
resources). 
 75. Id. 
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frequently step in and “jump-start” the process by declaring that 
someone’s rights have been violated.76 
Public school financing is particularly susceptible to political 
market failure because children cannot vote, children in low-income 
families are especially underrepresented in statehouses, and voters 
generally resist attempts to send locally raised revenues to other 
localities. First, the right to education is uniquely vulnerable to 
majoritarian attack because very few of the right holders are 
members of the electorate.77 Given that children cannot vote, they 
must rely on others to value a quality education on their behalf either 
out of altruism or because they see some personal benefit in so doing, 
like reducing their need for private child care, improving the 
economy, or stabilizing their own retirement by preparing future 
workers.78 Long-term investments, however, are notoriously difficult 
in political bodies because they involve short-term sacrifices.79 This 
differential could also be explained as a time-based, or “vertical,” 
political externality because “[present] constituents obtain benefits at 
the expense of other [future] constituents.”80 Here, the present voters 
gain lower taxes at the expense of educating future voters. 
A second reason the right to education is unusually predisposed 
to political market failure is that the children for whom the right 
matters the most, at-risk students,81 are concentrated in a few 
 
 76. Heise, supra note 50, at 306. 
 77. Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for Children’s 
Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1956 (1993) (“Investing in children’s human capital on a pay-
as-you-go basis requires present voters to sacrifice in order to increase the returns enjoyed by a 
future generation. Unfortunately, that future generation lacks voting power at the time the 
decision to invest must be made.”). 
 78. Id. at 1957. 
 79. Id. at 1956. 
 80. Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster 
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 109 (2006) (explaining that vertical externalities occur when 
there are time differences between paying and receiving constituents). Politicians are unwilling 
to invest in disaster prevention programs whose benefit will accrue to future generations and 
thus future politicians but they are very willing to overspend on disaster response in the present 
term. Id. at 104. In the same sense, politicians are willing to spend billions to incarcerate 
undereducated people in the present but are unwilling to spend a fraction of that on improving 
public education for low-income children to prevent future crime. 
 81. Although many factors influence a student’s risk for academic difficulties, living in 
poverty is the most commonly used indicator. See, e.g., KAN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., AT-RISK 
DEFINITION 1, available at http://www3.ksde.org/leaf/survey_on_education_costs/at-risk.pdf 
(“Kansas statutes define at-risk as the number of students eligible for free lunches.”). In 
addition to living in a low-income household, living with only one parent or with someone other 
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legislative districts82 and command fewer votes per child than their 
non-at-risk peers.83 For example, in a low-income area, single-parent 
families are more common.84 
Data from the U.S. Census Bureau help quantify the differences. 
In 2005, an average single-earner household had roughly $30,000 in 
income and contained 2.3 people.85 Recognizing that a substantial 
number of those households were single adults, those low-income 
households that contain children would contain more people than the 
average: it is reasonable to say the ratio of voters to children in a 
lower-income household is roughly one voter to 1.3 children. In 
contrast, an average dual-earner household earned around $80,000 
and contained three people.86 Because a dual-earner household 
almost invariably requires two adults, the ratio in that case is closer to 
two voters to one child. Therefore, approximately 2.6 times as many 
votes represent each non-at-risk child as do each at-risk child.87 This 
analysis is necessarily imperfect because the data are only available in 
 
than a parent, having poorly educated parents, and being a non-native English speaker are risk 
factors. 
 82. In the past three decades, poverty has become increasingly concentrated in inner cities 
as “high-poverty ghettos and barrios” have expanded rapidly. Paul A. Jargowsky, Sprawl, 
Concentration of Poverty, and Urban Inequality, in URBAN SPRAWL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES 
AND POLICY RESPONSES 39, 42 (Gregory Squires ed., 2002). 
 83. As a general matter, wealthier people have fewer children. Now We Are 300,000,000, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2006, at 29, 29; see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN 
WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at 4 (2005) (showing that women in the $20,000–$34,999 annual family 
income bracket have 18 percent more children than do women in the $100,000 and above 
bracket); Robert L. Brown, Baby Boom and Baby Bust: Fertility Rates and Why They Vary, 
CONTINGENCIES, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 17, 18 (explaining that the more educated a woman is, the 
fewer children she has because the opportunity cost of having children is higher). 
 84. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, RATE OF CHILDREN IN LOW-INCOME 
FAMILIES VARIES WIDELY BY STATE 2 (2004) (“Single-parent families are more than twice as 
likely to be low-income as two-parent families.”); see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILDREN’S 
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 14 (2003) (showing that 
although more than half of children in families below the poverty line live with only one parent, 
only about 7 percent of children in families earning more than $75,000 annually do). 
 85. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement, Selected Characteristics of Households by Total Money Income in 2005, available 
at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032006/hhinc/new01_001.htm. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The high income ratio of 2:1 reduces to 2. The low income ratio of 1:1.3 reduces to 0.77. 
To compare the two ratios, divide the first by the second: 2/0.77 = 2.6. Certainly, not all non-
earners are children and not all voters are wage-earners, but almost equally certainly, and 
despite some minors in the workforce, nearly all wage-earners are eligible to vote and nearly all 
children are non-earners. Other evidence also corroborates the assumptions that underlie this 
methodology. See supra notes 81–84. 
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aggregated form. In its rough sketches, however, it demonstrates a 
discrepancy in the political voice of children from different 
backgrounds. This imbalance is further exacerbated by the fact that 
eligible voters in low-income areas are less likely to vote in general.88 
With that kind of imbalance, it is not surprising that at-risk children 
face an uphill battle in the legislature for adequate funding for their 
schools. 
Third, school funding decisions are susceptible to legislature 
capture. Professor Clayton Gillette provides an excellent depiction of 
how this process applies to school funding decisions: 
[P]ublic choice theory tells us that the very fact that local 
representatives are making these decisions will frustrate reform 
efforts. . . . [S]tate legislators from wealthy areas will be reluctant to 
engage in substantial redistribution of local school dollars. Even 
well-meaning legislators will fear electoral redress should they spend 
local dollars on non-local functions. One can readily appreciate the 
dilemma of the state legislator who agrees that some redistribution 
is appropriate, but who fears informing constituents that he or she 
has voted to send their tax dollars to a neighboring locality.89 
This is an example of a horizontal political externality90 because the 
benefits would accrue to people in the poorer areas who could not 
vote for the representatives from the wealthier areas whose support 
would be needed to pass the law—there is no electoral payoff to the 
suburban legislator for supporting improvement of the urban schools. 
Taken together, these factors counsel courts to limit their 
deference to the legislature when adjudicating cases regarding school 
financing in particular, and educational adequacy in general. For the 
reasons discussed in this Part, the political branches are often 
unwilling to uphold educational rights, and this “political 
voicelessness” creates a political market failure because it produces 
an “inefficient underinvestment” in the education of future 
 
 88. Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Individual and Systemic Influences on Turnout: 
Who Votes? 1984, J. POL., Aug. 1992, at 718, 725; see also Ian Millhiser, Note, What Happens to a 
Dream Deferred: Cleansing the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
55 DUKE L.J. 405, 412 (2005) (noting that lower-educated people are less likely to vote). 
 89. Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary 
Note, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 37, 49 (1996). 
 90. See Depoorter, supra note 80, at 109 (noting that horizontal externalities among 
different political actors occur when there are geographic, rather than temporal, differences 
between paying and receiving constituents). 
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generations.91 This market failure, however, could be “particularly 
susceptible to judicial resolution” because judicial involvement would 
provide political cover for legislators who would like to allocate 
resources more equitably but do not for fear of electoral reprisals.92 
Although most state judges operate in some type of political 
market, few if any are in the same type of market as legislators: 
judicial retention elections are rarely contested,93 judges usually do 
not run as members of political parties,94 some judges face political 
review by the legislature or the governor rather than the voters,95 and 
even those state high court judges who face electoral review do so on 
a statewide rather than a districted basis.96 These factors, combined 
with the overarching difference in the job description of a judge,97 
indicate that they are in a better position than legislators to withstand 
electoral pressures on their decisions. 
In addition to political cover, when courts frame issues in terms 
of rights rather than policy preferences, legislators can be encouraged 
to adopt a more rights-based approach to lawmaking, making fair and 
just decisions rather than those that are merely self-serving in the 
political marketplace.98 Unfortunately, as Part IV.A explains, some 
legislators need more encouragement or cover than others, and the 
market failure in those cases requires more than a jump start. In those 
 
 91. Stout, supra note 77, at 1957. 
 92. Gillette, supra note 89, at 49. 
 93. See, e.g., Iowa Judicial Branch, Judicial Retention Elections, http://www.judicial.state. 
ia.us/Public_Information/About_Judges/Retention/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (“In a retention 
election, judges do not have opponents.”). 
 94. LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL 
REPORT 6–7 (2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_2005.pdf (noting that, of states 
that elect judges, more use nonpartisan elections than partisan ones). 
 95. BARAN, supra note 47, at 2. 
 96. For example, North Carolina Supreme Court justices are elected by statewide ballot. 
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16. 
 97. See In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (N.Y. 2003) (“Unlike other elected officials, 
however, judges do not serve particular constituencies but are sworn to apply the law 
impartially to any litigant appearing before the court. Once elected to the bench, a judge’s role 
is significantly different from others who take part in the political process . . . .”). 
 98. See Heise, supra note 50, at 306 (calling such legislative action a “veil of ignorance” 
approach to lawmaking because lawmakers would pursue legislative activity without regard to 
electoral concerns such as to whom rights or benefits would accrue); see also JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that the just rules for society are those that 
would be chosen by one situated behind an imaginary “veil of ignorance,” who does not know 
“his place in society, his class position . . . his intelligence, strength, and the like”). 
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cases, the courts should see their more aggressive involvement as 
merited—if not required—by their ultimate duty to the people.99 
III.  WHEN THE SYSTEM WORKS 
Since the early 1970s, forty-six state high courts have dealt with 
the issue of educational rights,100 and it is not surprising that there 
have been forty-six different outcomes, both in terms of liability and 
remedy. Perhaps the greatest difference, even between states that 
have had similar outcomes, is the speed with which and degree to 
which the legislative and executive branches have complied with the 
courts’ orders.101 The separation of powers doctrine, however, 
assumes that each branch of government will fulfill its duties.102 This 
Part examines situations in which that assumption was true, along 
with the reaction from the courts and the impact of the litigation on 
the children. It explores the experiences in Kentucky and 
Massachusetts, where each branch upheld its end of the bargain: the 
court defined the rights guaranteed by the state’s constitution, and 
the legislature responded quickly and completely with substantial 
reforms. 
The drama of school finance litigation in Kentucky could hardly 
have followed the separation of powers script better than it did. The 
challenge to the state’s finance law was filed in late 1985,103 and the 
Kentucky Supreme Court issued the final decision in June of 1989.104 
 
 99. See Koski, supra note 4, at 1297–98 (“And if the political branches do not respond 
appropriately, the judicial ‘veto power’ can again be invoked.”). 
 100. See Nat’l Access Network, Litigations Challenging Constitutionality of K-12 Funding in 
the 50 States (2007), http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/In-Process%20Litigations.pdf 
(noting that Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah have never had a lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of K-12 funding). Although Nevada has not had a suit 
challenging its education system, its supreme court has interpreted the education clause of its 
constitution to compel a remedy in a funding stalemate. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 101. See Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in 
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 498–99 (1999) (“In [states other than Kentucky], responses to 
parallel court decrees have generally been slow, piecemeal, and seldom in compliance with the 
constitutional mandate on the first attempt.”). 
 102. See Heise, supra note 50, at 326 (“[E]ach branch necessarily relies on the others to 
fulfill its respective duties. If each governmental branch meets its obligations, conscientiously 
performs its assigned roles, and respects the scope and contours of its counterparts’ roles, the 
tri-partite form of government should perform as designed.”). 
 103. Debra H. Dawahare, Public School Reform: Kentucky’s Solution, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 27, 40 (2004). 
 104. Id. at 43. 
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The high court’s decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education105 
was simultaneously sweeping and specific: it declared the entire 
system of schools in Kentucky inadequate, requiring a complete re-
creation of the system,106 and also spelled out seven detailed areas in 
which all children must acquire proficiency.107 What the court did not 
do was specify how the school system should be re-created, organized, 
or financed;108 it merely laid out, in no uncertain terms, what the 
Kentucky Constitution required in the end. The court then gave the 
General Assembly until the end of the regular legislative session in 
1990 to solve the problem.109 
In contrast to nearly every other state where plaintiffs have 
prevailed in a school adequacy case, the Kentucky General Assembly 
reacted with “astonishing” speed.110 In just over ten months, the 
Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA)111 became law.112 KERA 
was indeed the complete overhaul of the education system that Rose 
mandated and became a national model for school reform.113 Under 
KERA, the Kentucky Department of Education was totally 
 
 105. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 106. Id. at 215. 
 107. Id. at 212–13. The court required 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a 
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, 
social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) 
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to 
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) 
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; 
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose 
and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational 
skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market. 
Id. at 212. 
 108. Id. at 214 (rejecting the state’s contention that the trial court had ordered specific 
legislation enacted). The court went on: 
It is clear that the specifics of the legislation will be left up to the wisdom of the 
General Assembly. Clearly, no ‘legislating’ is present in the decision of the trial court, 
and more importantly, as we have previously said, there is none present in the 
decision of this Court. 
Id. 
 109. Id. at 216. 
 110. Hunter, supra note 101, at 498–99. 
 111. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 156.005–168.100 (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 112. Dawahare, supra note 103, at 47. 
 113. Hunter, supra note 101, at 499. 
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redesigned, an accountability system centered on performance-based 
assessments was created, and a substantial minimum of per pupil 
funding was guaranteed.114 In the decade that followed, “Kentucky . . . 
sustained the most long-lasting, comprehensive education reforms in 
the nation” and student achievement improved.115 As a testament to 
the General Assembly’s embrace of its role in remedying the 
constitutional inadequacies of the Kentucky schools, there have been 
no further proceedings regarding Rose. 
A similar situation unfolded in Massachusetts, where the 1993 
case McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education116 found 
that state’s education system constitutionally inadequate.117 In 
articulating the breadth of the state’s constitutional obligation, the 
Massachusetts court quoted directly from Rose the seven capacities 
that children must develop in school.118 The McDuffy court also 
explicitly recognized the proper limits of its power by 
“presum[ing] . . . that the Commonwealth will fulfil its responsibility 
with respect to defining the specifics and the appropriate means to 
provide the constitutionally-required education.”119 In this case, as in 
Kentucky, the court’s presumption proved correct. 
A mere three days after the opinion in McDuffy was issued, the 
legislature passed the Education Reform Act of 1993 (ERA),120 which 
“radically restructured the funding of public education . . . based on 
uniform criteria of need, and dramatically increased . . . mandatory 
financial assistance to public schools.”121 The ERA also created 
objective and performance-based accountability measures for all 
children, teachers, schools, and districts.122 Although the education 
system in Massachusetts is not perfect and gaps based on wealth 
remain between districts, “the elected branches have acted to 
transform a dismal and fractured public school system into a unified 
system that has yielded . . . ‘impressive results in terms of 
 
 114. Id. at 500–02. 
 115. Id. at 515–16. 
 116. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
 117. Id. at 555. 
 118. Id. at 554. 
 119. Id. at 555 n.92. 
 120. Education Reform Act of 1993, 1993 Mass. Acts 71 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of MASS. ANN. LAWS chs. 10, 15, 29, 60, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 150E, 214 (LexisNexis 2006)). 
 121. Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, C.J., 
concurring). 
 122. Id. 
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improvement in overall student performance.’”123 In declining to 
continue its oversight of the school reform process, the Supreme 
Judicial Court lauded the legislature for upholding its end of the 
separation of powers bargain by acting quickly and creating a “steady 
trajectory of progress” for the state’s education system.124 
In both Kentucky and Massachusetts, the courts issued strong 
and specific rulings in their first dispositions of the cases, the state 
legislatures responded quickly and assertively by substantially 
reforming the education systems, and no further intervention by the 
courts was needed to ensure constitutional compliance. In neither 
case did the court decide how much money would be spent or any 
other functional detail of the reformed education system.125 The 
courts were able to enforce their respective state constitutions while 
deferring to the separation of powers precisely because the other 
branches of government accepted the courts’ rulings and acted. 
IV.  WHEN THE LAWMAKERS DROP THE BALL 
Although the Kentucky and Massachusetts legislatures proved 
amenable to change, it may be difficult for a state court to know in 
advance what type of legislative reaction it will receive when it is 
deciding a constitutional case. If the legislature proves unwilling to 
remedy the situation, how should a state court, which need not be 
preoccupied with the Article III interpretation of the separation of 
powers doctrine,126 respond? This Part examines three possibilities by 
examining the approaches of Ohio and New Jersey, New York and 
North Carolina, and Nevada. Section A looks at the overly 
deferential stance of the courts in Ohio and New Jersey as a response 
to legislative intransigence and the results for children and their 
constitutional rights. In contrast, Section B examines New York’s and 
North Carolina’s progress in balancing the separation of powers 
between the courts and legislatures and the need to ensure 
compliance with constitutional mandates. In both states, key aspects 
of this success have included courts retaining jurisdiction over the 
 
 123. Id. (quoting Hancock v. Driscoll, No. 02-2978, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 118, at *486 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2004)). 
 124. Id. at 1139. 
 125. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. 
Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993); see also supra note 
108. 
 126. See supra Part I (discussing the separation of powers doctrine). 
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cases, being specific and upfront about timelines and expectations, 
clearly defining the right at issue, and following through with 
enforcement proceedings if the legislatures fail to act. Section C then 
examines the unique experience in Nevada where the supreme court 
effectively prioritized sections of the state’s constitution to lower the 
standard for increasing taxes to assure that educational rights were 
upheld. 
A. Refusing to Fight Back: Ohio and New Jersey 
In 1991, students from rural Perry County, Ohio, filed suit 
against the state of Ohio, alleging that the state’s system of funding 
schools failed to meet the state constitution’s mandate that the state 
establish a “thorough and efficient” system of education.127 The Ohio 
Supreme Court first decided the case in 1997 in DeRolph v. State 
(DeRolph I),128 calling for a complete overhaul of the state’s school 
funding system.129 The General Assembly’s piecemeal reform efforts 
were found inadequate when the system was again declared 
unconstitutional in 2000 (DeRolph II)130 and then again in 2001 
(DeRolph III).131 
Throughout this process, the court attempted to keep its distance 
from policymaking, but in the 2001 decision, DeRolph III, it declared 
that “changes to the [funding] formula are required to make the new 
plan constitutional.”132 The court went on to list requirements133 at a 
level of specificity that belied the court’s exhortation in the opinion’s 
opening paragraphs that designing a plan is “not [its] burden.”134 This 
plan, however, was vacated a year later in DeRolph IV135 when the 
court issued a prompt reversal.136 Then in 2003, after an election 
changed the composition of the court, it issued DeRolph V,137 which 
ended the line of cases by declaring that the trial court no longer had 
 
 127. Obhof, supra note 63, at 83–84 (internal quotations omitted). 
 128. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
 129. Id. at 747. 
 130. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1020 (Ohio 2000). 
 131. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1200–01 (Ohio 2001). 
 132. Id. at 1200. 
 133. Id. at 1200–01. 
 134. Id. at 1189. 
 135. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002). 
 136. Id. at 530. 
 137. State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003). 
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jurisdiction over the remedy.138 The case is therefore over but the 
issue remains unresolved.139 
After six years of the General Assembly’s failing to comply with 
the court’s mandates, it is ironic that the court so adamantly defended 
its decision in DeRolph IV to give the legislature total authority over 
solving the problem.140 In the ten years after the court found Ohio’s 
schools constitutionally inadequate, the court did not reverse its 
finding, and judicial restraint did not improve the education of the 
generation of children who attended these schools during that 
period.141 
The New Jersey experience—still ongoing in 2007—has involved 
a similar string of repetitive decisions lasting over thirty years; and 
progress, when it has come at all, has come in inches, not miles.142 The 
ordeal began in 1970 when Robinson v. Cahill143 was first filed.144 In 
the first New Jersey Supreme Court decision, the court upheld the 
trial court’s determination that the state’s funding system was 
unconstitutionally inequitable but failed to define the constitutional 
mandate of “a thorough and efficient system” of education.145 At the 
time, the state provided only 28 percent of education funding—
substantially below the 40 percent that was required by state statute 
and was the national average.146 Regarding remedies, the case was 
reminiscent of Brown v. Board of Education’s147 “all deliberate speed” 
 
 138. Id. at 202. 
 139. Hignett, supra note 11, at 740. 
 140. DeRolph V, 789 N.E.2d at 202 (“The duty now lies with the General Assembly to 
remedy an educational system that has been found by the majority in DeRolph IV to still be 
unconstitutional.”). The court never found the school system constitutional or overturned the 
substantive findings of DeRolph I, II, and IV. Id. 
 141. See Hignett, supra note 11, at 760 (noting Chief Justice Moyer’s frustration in his 
DeRolph IV dissent that, without the judicial remedy from DeRolph III, the parties are 
“simply . . . in the same position that they were in when this litigation all began”). Moyer was 
the court’s staunchest advocate of deference in DeRolph I and II. See id. at 755 (noting that 
“Moyer dissented on separation of powers grounds”). 
 142. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s Experience 
Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 618 (2004) (“Over the 
course of this tumultuous period . . . the New Jersey Supreme Court was continually called upon 
to address school finance deficiencies, but was repeatedly proven powerless in its attempts to 
reform urban education.”). 
 143. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
 144. Greif, supra note 142, at 618. 
 145. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 295 (internal quotations omitted). 
 146. Id. at 296. 
 147. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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requirement,148 vaguely stating that the legislature would need “some 
time” to act and inviting parties back for further argument on the 
remedy issue.149 
There were eventually seven New Jersey Supreme Court 
decisions in the Robinson line of cases.150 During the 1970s, the New 
Jersey Legislature developed a “pattern of noncompliance” with the 
court’s rulings.151 The court responded with tough talk in Robinson 
IV,152 noting that the “time has now arrived” for the court to “act, 
even . . . to encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches 
of government” because “no alternative remain[ed].”153 Unfortunately 
for New Jersey’s children, this talk was not accompanied by 
sufficiently strong action as the court simply repeated its order for a 
new funding system, which the legislature enacted and then refused to 
fund.154 Only when the high court enforced an injunction closing all 
the schools in the state did the legislature appropriate the funding 
necessary for the new system, which relieved localities of some of the 
financial burden of operating schools.155 But this injunction did not 
come until Robinson VI.156 
Nearly two decades later, serious inequities persisted among the 
bottom decile of districts, and the Robinson story virtually repeated 
itself in Abbott v. Burke157 and its progeny. In these cases the court 
became gradually more specific over time due to its “[f]rustrat[ion] 
with the recalcitrance of the New Jersey Legislature.”158 Although the 
order in Abbott V159 was more specific and demanding than the order 
 
 148. Id. at 301. 
 149. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 298. In Brown, the arguments regarding remedies were 
scheduled in the term following the one that decided the segregation issue. Brown, 347 U.S. at 
495. 
 150. Greif, supra note 142, at 620. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 153. Id. at 724. 
 154. See Sheil, supra note 62, at 629–33 (noting that in Robinson I the Court withheld 
consideration of whether it could order equalization of funds if the state failed to act, but that in 
Robinson IV a “decidedly less tentative supreme court ordered a redistribution of state funds to 
increase aid to poorer school districts as well as equalize tax burdens for support of education 
expenditures”). 
 155. Id. at 634. 
 156. Id. (citing Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 358 A.2d 457, 459 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 157. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
 158. Greif, supra note 142, at 615. 
 159. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) 
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in Rose,160 the legislature seemed to have learned from experience 
that there was little consequence to violating the court’s orders.161 This 
lesson was reinforced in Abbott VI162 when the court refused to 
appoint a standing master or issue an injunction to force the state to 
stop dragging its heels in implementing the preschool programs 
required under Abbott V.163 Although the state did eventually get 
around to creating the preschools, five years after the Abbott VI 
decision, only 40 percent of preschool classrooms in districts covered 
by the Abbott decision were performing at the “good-to-excellent 
range” or better as mandated by the court.164 The New Jersey system 
improved, but given its slow rate of improvement, many more 
generations of children will be undereducated before the problem is 
solved.165 
Although the Ohio court simply threw up its hands in frustration, 
the New Jersey court did finally get tough, but it took thirty years. In 
the time between the original filing in Robinson in 1970 and the 
judicial remedy in Abbott VI in 2000, New Jersey schools remained 
constitutionally inadequate according to the court. During that time, 
several million students attended New Jersey public schools166 and 
were thus denied their constitutional right to an adequate education. 
 
 160. Abbott V required whole-school reform and full-day kindergarten and half-day 
preschool programs for three- and four-year-olds, technology programs, accountability 
programs, alternative schools, school-to-work and college-transition programs, rehabilitating 
and constructing needed infrastructure, id. at 473–74, whereas Rose specified the standards that 
must be met and left the implementation to the legislature, Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989). 
 161. See Greif, supra note 142, at 616 (noting that the “political leaders continued to find 
wiggle room to thwart the thrust of the court’s orders”). 
 162. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VI), 748 A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000). 
 163. See id. at 95–96 (“We do not see the need for the appointment of a Judge of the 
Superior Court as a Standing Master . . . . Education disputes are properly decided in the first 
instance by those statutorily entrusted with that responsibility.”). 
 164. Laura Fasbach, Gains Found in Abbott Preschools, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), 
May 20, 2005, at A3. 
 165. See Abbott VI, 748 A.2d at 85 (noting that “another generation of children will pay the 
price for each year of delay”). 
 166. See Southern Regional Education Board, Elementary and Secondary School 
Enrollment, Enrollment Data-Public (June 2007), available at http://www.sreb.org/DataLibrary/ 
tables/FB07.xls (reporting annual enrollment of students in New Jersey schools). Dividing the 
sum of the annual enrollment during these years by thirty to find the average number of 
students enrolled per year and then again by thirteen (the number of grades in public schools) 
gives the average number of students per class. Multiplying this figure by the forty-two classes of 
students that passed through the New Jersey schools between 1970 and 2000 gives a total of 4.19 
million students. 
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For those students and for the hundreds of thousands in Ohio who 
continue to attend constitutionally inadequate schools, there was no 
remedy because the legislatures refused to act, and the courts bowed 
in deference. 
B. Start Strong and Carry a Big Stick: New York and North Carolina 
The courts in New York attempted to prevent much of the back-
and-forth with the legislature by being upfront about their 
expectations. In 1993, the nonprofit Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
representing schoolchildren from New York City, filed suit against 
the state, alleging that inadequate funding was denying the children 
their right to a sound basic education.167 In its first decision on the 
merits in 2003, the Court of Appeals hoped to emulate the Kentucky 
experience—and avoid the prolonged litigation experienced in New 
Jersey168—by “initially offer[ing] more detailed remedial directions.”169 
Like the Kentucky court, the New York court provided the 
legislature with a specific definition of the skills students must attain 
to fulfill the state’s guarantee of a “sound basic education.”170 The 
court attempted to strike the balance in terms of deference by 
searching for a remedy that was “ultimately less entangling for the 
courts” than overseeing finance reform but “more promising” for the 
plaintiffs than simply directing the state to fix the problem.171 The 
court settled on largely affirming the trial court’s order and requiring 
the state to determine the cost of providing a sound basic education 
to the children of New York City and then to provide it.172 The 
legislature was also given a strict one-year time limit in which to 
remedy the financial inadequacies of the system.173 
 
 167. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., A Sound Basic Education for All Children: The 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, http://www.cfequity.org/ns-nys.htm (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 330 (“[W]e equate[] a sound basic education with ‘the basic literacy, 
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as 
civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.’” (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity 
v. State (CFE I), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 171. Id. at 345. 
 172. Id. at 348. 
 173. See id. at 349 (“[D]efendants should have until July 30, 2004 to implement the 
necessary measures.”). 
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In the 2006 round of litigation, the New York courts virtually 
bypassed concerns about the separation of powers, and the issue on 
appeal became very specific: not whether the Court of Appeals 
should order the legislature to appropriate a specific dollar amount to 
remedy the problem, but exactly how much the legislature must 
spend.174 Although the decision was written in the language of 
deference to the state’s other branches of government,175 the court 
was not deferring. The legislature failed to meet the deadline set in 
the 2003 case and was ordered to spend at least $1.9 billion more per 
year on the New York City public schools.176 The court could have 
adopted the New Jersey brand of deference and simply ordered the 
state legislature to remedy the situation however it saw best, but 
instead, after having given the state that chance after the 2003 
decision,177 the court left no room for political wrangling. In the wake 
of the decision, then Governor-elect Eliot Spitzer continued to 
promise more than the minimum, and even the state’s Republican 
leaders, who held up the same $1.9 billion proposal in 2004 leading to 
the courts’ renewed involvement in the case, said they supported 
fulfilling the court’s mandate.178 In April 2007, the legislature 
approved the state budget with an increase of $1.76 billion for 
education, about half of which went to New York City.179 Although 
this was only half the mandated amount, it constituted a significant 
victory for the plaintiffs, coming a mere four years after the first high 
 
 174. The Referees appointed by the trial court concluded that $5.63 billion per year for the 
New York City public schools would be sufficient, whereas Defendants, who ultimately 
prevailed in the high court, were seeking a ruling requiring only $1.9 billion per year. Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III), 861 N.E.2d 50, 55–57 (N.Y. 2006). 
 175. Id. at 58 (noting in particular that “the Judiciary has a duty ‘to defer to the Legislature 
in matters of policymaking, particularly in a matter so vital as education financing . . . . [The 
courts] have neither the authority, nor the ability, nor the will, to micromanage education 
financing.’” (quoting CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 345)). 
 176. Id. at 52–53. The $1.9 billion cost estimate was endorsed by a special commission 
created by Governor George Pataki to study the issue and was substantially lower than the 
Referees’ estimate of $5.63 billion. Id. at 56. The key differences in the numbers were whether 
districts spending above the median for all effective districts are financially inefficient; how 
much to weight the needs of English language learners, disabled students, and low-income 
students; and which cost adjustment method was used to compare different parts of the state. Id. 
at 60. 
 177. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 178. David M. Herszenhorn, List for Schools Seems to Grow More Wishful: Ruling May 
Force City to Scale Back Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at B1. 
 179. Ford Fessenden, Schools are Seeking Higher Taxes Despite Extra Aid from Albany, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007, at A1. 
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court decision declaring the schools inadequate.180 As of December 
2007, however, it is unknown whether they will return to court 
seeking more. 
A similar situation has played out in North Carolina. In 2004, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court declared that students in many low 
wealth counties in the state were not receiving their constitutionally 
entitled “sound basic education.”181 The ruling came in response to a 
suit filed in 1994 by parents and school boards in five rural counties 
that claimed the state was not providing adequate aid. As the suit 
progressed, six urban districts joined, claiming the state’s funding 
formula was inadequate to educate at-risk students and English 
language learners.182 In a prior decision denying the state’s motion to 
dismiss, the court, also emulating Rose, specifically defined the skills 
that composed a sound, basic education.183 In the 2004 decision, while 
repeatedly recognizing the separation of powers and the legislative 
and executive branches’ authority over the funding issue,184 the court 
ultimately remanded the case to the trial court to oversee the 
implementation rather than ordering it to relinquish jurisdiction.185 
Judge Howard Manning of the Wake County Superior Court has 
been an active manager of the case on remand, which has produced 
positive results across the state.186 The next year, Governor Mike 
Easley specially asked for and the general assembly appropriated $25 
million for a special fund that gives districts extra money for 
disadvantaged students.187 In 2006, the reluctant general assembly 
stepped up and doubled the fund for disadvantaged students, fully 
 
 180. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 2007–2008 Enacted Education Budget 
Legislation, http://www.cfequity.org/ns-legislation.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (“With 
Governor Spitzer’s leadership, we have turned litigation into law.” (quoting Geri Palast, 
Executive Dir., Campaign for Fiscal Equity)). 
 181. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 396 (N.C. 2004). 
 182. North Carolina Justice Center, Leandro Lawsuit, www.ncjustice.org/content/index. 
php?pid=78 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 183. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). 
 184. Hoke County Bd. of Educ., 599 S.E.2d at 395 (“[W]e . . . recognize our limitations in 
providing specific remedies for violations committed by other government branches in . . . 
public school education, that is within their primary domain.”). 
 185. Id. at 397. 
 186. See Todd Silberman, Schools Want a Spending Plan; Wake Judge Hears Funding 
Request, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 8, 2005, at 5B (“No more playing the budget 
game . . . . I don’t want to hear it any more.” (quoting Judge Manning)). 
 187. See id. (“The State Board of Education has requested $25 million for the disadvantaged 
student fund—about the same that Easley provided during two special allocations last year.”). 
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funded the low wealth equalization fund, and spent a total of $600 
million more than it spent in fiscal year 2005 on education 
statewide.188 Manning’s management has gone beyond the budget: in 
the spring of 2006, he threatened to enjoin seventeen very low-
performing high schools from opening in August if significant changes 
in leadership and design were not made.189 By August, sixteen schools 
had made the changes and opened on schedule, many with new ninth-
grade academies to improve student performance before students 
take graduation tests.190 
In both New York and North Carolina, the states’ highest courts 
spoke repeatedly of deference to the legislature, but they also stated 
that such deference comes with the requirement of the legislature 
doing its job. In both states, by retaining jurisdiction over the cases 
and remanding them to trial level, judges maintained a commitment 
to ensuring that the students’ rights are enforced. Furthermore, both 
courts were specific and upfront about their expectations. Like 
Kentucky, both states precisely defined the scope of the right at issue. 
New York additionally set a tight deadline for compliance, and then, 
unlike Ohio, moved forward with enforcement proceedings when the 
deadline was not met. Although more time is inevitably needed to see 
whether these actions were enough to secure students’ rights 
substantively, initial evidence is promising. 
C. Change the Rules of the Game: Nevada 
Nevada has never had an education equality or adequacy case, 
but in 2003, the state came to a standoff regarding its education 
budget.191 Four provisions of the Nevada Constitution seemed to 
conflict:192 the legislature is the only body that can raise revenue or 
 
 188. Todd Silberman & Dan Kane, Schools’ Budget Ship Comes In, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 6, 2006, at 1A. 
 189. Todd Silberman, Manning Likes Progress of Failing Schools, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 19, 2006, at 5B. 
 190. Id. Ninth-grade academies are an alternative organizational model encompassing 
smaller learning communities, intensive tutoring and remediation, and mentoring for students. 
 191. Nat’l Access Network, Litigation: Nevada, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/nv/ 
lit_nv.php3 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 192. Guinn v. Legislature of the State of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269, 1272–73 (Nev. 2003), overruled 
in part by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 348 (Nev. 2006) (overruling only the 
portion of Guinn that declares the procedural provisions of the state constitution must yield to 
the substantive ones). 
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appropriate funds;193 the state must fund a system of common 
schools;194 the state must have a balanced budget;195 and by a 1996 
amendment, tax increases must pass the legislature by a two-thirds 
majority.196 After a full 120-day legislative session and two special 
sessions on the education budget, the legislature was at a deadlock, 
having passed an appropriations bill by a simple majority but having 
been unable to pass the necessary tax increases by the required 
supermajority.197 The Governor subsequently sued the legislature and 
asked the court to issue writs of mandamus requiring that the 
legislature raise the appropriate revenue so the schools could open.198 
The Nevada Supreme Court went one step further and, in addition to 
issuing the writ to the legislature, waived the supermajority 
requirement and allowed the tax increases to pass by a simple 
majority.199 
The court reasoned that although the legislature had complete 
control over the budget process, “constitutional construction is purely 
a province of the judiciary.”200 The court then proceeded to follow 
standard rules of statutory construction, relying on the premise that 
specific provisions should control over general ones.201 The court 
determined that procedural provisions are more general than 
substantive ones because the former apply to all bills under 
consideration.202 Under the status quo, the legislature’s adherence to 
the procedural supermajority provision was preventing it from 
actualizing the substantive education funding requirement.203 
Therefore, the court concluded that the provisions could not be 
harmonized and that “the procedure must yield” to the basic, 
substantive right.204 As part of its support for this outcome, the court 
 
 193. NEV. CONST. arts. 3, 4, § 19. 
 194. Id. art. 11, § 6. 
 195. Id. art. 9, § 2. 
 196. Id. art. 4, § 18, cl. 2. 
 197. Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1273. In Nevada, the legislature in special sessions may only consider 
the agenda the governor puts forward. NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 9. In this case, the education 
budget and its accompanying funding mechanism were the only items up for discussion. Guinn, 
71 P.3d at 1273. 
 198. Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1272. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1274. 
 201. Id. at 1274–75. 
 202. Id. at 1276. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1275. 
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cited a Wyoming Supreme Court opinion in that state’s education 
adequacy line of cases: “[c]onstitutional provisions imposing an 
affirmative mandatory duty upon the legislature are judicially 
enforceable in protecting individual rights, such as educational 
rights.”205 Two weeks after the court’s decision, the tax bill passed by a 
two-thirds majority as one Republican legislator who had previously 
voted against the bill changed his mind because he did not want the 
courts deciding the appropriate level of taxation.206 
In 2006, the Nevada high court held in Nevadans for Nevada v. 
Beers207 that the constitution must be read as a whole and the 
unambiguous text of the document is not dispensable.208 With regard 
to constitutional doctrine, Beers was correctly decided. In July of 
2003, however, the court was faced with an essentially 
insurmountable textual dilemma, and the tack it chose was essentially 
the only one available in which educational rights were recognized in 
any meaningful way. In the end, the Nevada court was able to secure 
students’ education rights through the proper delegation of powers by 
threatening the legislature with a loss of control over the situation. 
Even though the tax increase, the largest in the state’s history,209 
eventually passed by a two-thirds majority, it is undeniable that the 
court’s ruling prompted the reluctant Republican to change his 
position.210 Although the Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada211 decision 
was extreme, it shows that courts need not be deterred from their 
responsibility to enforce the entirety of the state’s constitution. 
*          *          * 
In Ohio and New Jersey, the courts’ unwillingness to push the 
legislatures harder has condemned millions of children to an 
education that is less than they deserve based on their state 
constitutions. In New York, North Carolina, and Nevada, on the 
 
 205. Id. (quoting Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995)). 
 206. See Ed Vogel, Assemblyman Who Broke Deadlock, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 23, 2003, 
at 8A (“[The Republican] did not want to risk a simple majority passage of a tax bill being 
challenged in court, so he broke the stalemate.”). 
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other hand, the courts have all seen fit to push the envelope of the 
separation of powers doctrine to protect and meaningfully realize 
individual students’ educational rights. These three states serve as 
examples of courts executing their duties to protect students’ 
educational rights in the face of legislatures that are less than willing 
to uphold their end of the separation of powers bargain. By issuing 
strong first opinions, retaining jurisdiction over the cases, and 
showing the seriousness of their commitment to educational rights, 
these courts demonstrate the effectiveness of taking advantage of the 
flexibility of the separation of powers doctrine at the state level. 
CONCLUSION 
More than three decades after Rodriguez, nine-year-olds in low-
income communities were still performing three grade levels behind 
their more affluent peers.212 Yet educating low-income students is not 
impossible; it simply takes more time, more effort, and more 
resources than the status quo provides.213 When students in every state 
have some form of constitutional right to education214 and the formula 
for educating all students is known, the achievement gap can only be 
attributed to a failure of will among those who control the resources. 
In such an environment, it is precisely the role of the courts to stand 
up for students, especially low-income students who are largely 
voiceless. Yet, in too many cases, the courts have restrained 
themselves out of an unnecessary devotion to a federal separation of 
powers doctrine developed for Article III courts. State courts are 
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substantively and significantly different from federal courts in that 
they enforce state constitutional rights that are frequently positive in 
nature, they have broad and inherent powers, they almost universally 
depend on electoral or legislative review, and they are institutionally 
competent vis-à-vis state legislatures. Because of these differences, 
state courts should embrace their own state vision of what the 
separation of powers requires, and they should not hesitate to do 
their part in upholding students’ educational rights. As courts in these 
cases embark on the challenge of enforcing students’ rights, they 
should do so with deference to and trust in the coequal branches of 
government, but they should also remain vigilant for evidence that 
“[their] trust was misplaced” and that a more active remedy has 
become necessary.215 
Although it is unlikely that the courts alone will ever be able to 
solve the problems of public education,216 they should not eschew 
their proper role in the process. In the meantime, citizens of every 
state should join Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of 
Appeals in being “hopeful” that their policymakers “will continue to 
strive to make the schools not merely adequate, but excellent.”217 
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